Publicity Placing Person in False Light

To successfully sue someone, you need to have a legally-recognised basis for suing them.  These legally-recognised bases for suing someone are called “causes of action”.  Many of them are obvious and well known: where the evidence justifies it, you can sue someone for breach of contract, wrongful dismissal, or defamation.  Other causes of action are less well known, but nevertheless well-established, such as certiorari or mandamus.

Notably, the list of legally-recognised causes of action is not a closed list.  Where the right conditions are met, new causes of action can be “discovered” by the courts. 

False Light

Late last year, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice “discovered” another new cause of action in the family law case of Yenovkian v Gulian

There was a trial to determine the issues of custody, access, and spousal support.  At the trial, the wife put forward evidence of websites written and published by the husband which alleged that the wife and her parents were involved in kidnapping, child abuse, assault, and making death threats (among other things). 

The husband’s websites (which are still up, in violation of court orders to take them down) are written by someone who is clearly unhinged, and the allegations they contains against his ex-wife are outrageous.  The judge decided to give Ms. Gulian a remedy for the injury she suffered in having these things written about her on the Internet. 

Rather than give the wife a judgment which was based on an already-recognised cause of action, the judge decided to base the ruling on a cause of action which had never previously been recognised in Ontario law.  The Judge held that the cause of action by which Ms. Gulian was entitled to a remedy was “publicity placing a person in a false light”, and she awarded Ms. Gulian $100,000.00.

This ruling creates a situation of significant uncertainty in Ontario law.  First, it is not at all clear from this ruling how “publicity placing a person in a false light” is different from good old-fashioned defamation.  I don’t see how accusing your ex-wife of kidnapping and child abuse could possibly be anything other than defamatory so, in my personal view, the judge did not need to recognise a new cause of action in order to give Ms. Gulian a remedy: she could have simply awarded Ms. Gulian damages based on defamation. 

Second, because this case was decided by the Superior Court and not by the Court of Appeal, it is not binding on other courts in Ontario.  My own suggestion would be that the job of introducing new causes of action into Ontario law should be left to the Court of Appeal, whose decisions are binding on all the courts in the province.  The last time a new cause of action was discovered in Ontario (“intrusion upon seclusion”), it was done by the Court of Appeal.  The last time the Superior Court attempted to discover a new cause of action (the “tort of harassment”), the ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal did not have the opportunity, in this case, to weigh in on the “false light” cause of action because the husband did not appeal.  One judge of the Superior Court was convinced that the cause of action of “publicity placing a person in a false light” exists in Ontario; another judge hearing a similar case may not be similarly convinced.  This creates the possibility of inconsistent legal rulings in the Ontario courts, which in turn could potentially erode public confidence in the justice system. Until the Court of Appeal rules on the “false light” cause of action, it will remain a big question mark in Ontario law. 

When will we next see a new cause of action recognised in Ontario?  I suspect it will not be for some time.  A new cause of action is supposed to fill a gap in the existing law, and where it is not immediately obvious that there is a gap in the law which needs to be filled, it will be less likely that any potential new cause of action will be recognised. 

Quick, Good, Cheap – Pick Two

Her Honour Madam Rosalie Abella, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, recently penned an opinion column in The Globe and Mail titled, “Our Civil Justice System needs to be Brought into the 21st Century” (subscription required). 

While I came to agree with Justice Abella’s conclusion, she actually made two arguments in order to get there.  And while I agree with her second argument, I cannot bring myself to agree with her first.

Her first argument is basically just “Change for change’s sake.”  She notes that the adversarial system of civil litigation we use today is pretty similar to the one used at the turn of the (last) century.  She then goes on to argue that, since the airplane and the Internet have been invented in that time, we should similarly change the way we resolve civil disputes. 

The flip side to the sentiment that “we should change with the times” is “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  And of course, our adversarial system of civil litigation has a lot of things to commend it.  It is a system which has been honed and refined over centuries and it does a fairly good job of serving its objectives.  While other systems of dispute resolution have been conceived and tried our adversarial system remains, to paraphrase Churchill, the worst system except for all the others which have been tried from time to time.  So I would disagree with the suggestion that we ought to make any substantial changes to our civil litigation system solely on the basis that it is an old system.  We should not tear down a fence unless we know why it was put up in the first place. 

That being said, Justice Abella’s second argument really lays bare the biggest shortcoming of our “least bad” system.  She persuasively argues that the system is just too inaccessible for regular people, for the dual reasons that (i) it is too expensive and (ii) it takes too long.  One cannot really disagree with her assertion that it should not take litigants “forever and thousands of dollars to decide where their children live, whether their employer should have fired them, or whether their accident was compensable.” 

The gap between reality and expectation for participants in the civil litigation system can be profound.  I blogged last week about an employment case in Ontario which took eleven (11) years to go from start to completion at the Court of Appeal.  By comparison, a few years ago I represented an employee in an employment case that was decided by the Court of Appeal eleven months after the employee was fired.  And do you know what they told me after it was over?  They said, “If I knew it would have taken this long, I never would have done it.”  And that was in a case which, by the usual standards, was resolved quickly.

In my own practice, I have seen a fair number of clients walk away from good, promising cases—cases worth tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars—because they are not willing to wait 1, 2, or 3 years before seeing the inside of a courtroom, or because they are no longer willing to continue funding litigation which will go on for another 1, 2, or 3 years. 

The people who are most likely to be caught on the outside are those who can’t or won’t sink thousands of dollars, and years of their lives, into fighting a legal dispute – even though their case may be just.  Justice Abella perspicaciously identifies this problem when she says, “They want their day in court, not their years.”

Normally, this is where I would criticize the author for identifying the problem but not identifying any solutions.  But I can’t criticize Justice Abella here, because I don’t have any answers at the moment either.  The civil justice system serves multiple goals, among them efficiency, truth-seeking, and justice.  Major reforms to improve the outcomes in one area are almost certain to be at the expense of the other goals of the justice system.  The legal system finds itself stuck in the classic consumer quandary of “Quick, cheap, good – pick two”. 

What should we do?  Eliminate or severely curtail pre-trial discovery?  That would certainly get us to trial more efficiently.  It would also bring back the old days of “trial by ambush”, which the profession definitely wants to avoid.  Getting rid of “trial by ambush” was a major reason for the significant expansion of pre-trial discovery in the first place.  We can make our civil litigation system quicker and cheaper, but it won’t be as good.

While I can’t say what we should do, I can make a suggestion about what we should not do.  We should not do mandatory mediation.

In my opinion, the experiment of mandatory mediation is a failure and should be abandoned.  For a number of years now, any civil lawsuit in Ottawa, Toronto, or Windsor has been required to go to mandatory mediation as a necessary pre-condition to going to trial.  And why is this such a bad a idea?  Simply put, if you want to make the process of a lawsuit quicker and cheaper, you should not add additional procedural hurdles to the lawsuit.  Mandatory mediation adds both time and expense and makes the overall lawsuit take even longer.  I cannot understand why anyone thought that the system would be made more efficient by adding an extra step to civil lawsuits: it is impossible to make a journey quicker by adding pit stops.  If we want to make the process of civil lawsuit a little bit quicker and a little bit less expensive without sacrificing quality, we can start by eliminating the costly and time-consuming step of mandatory mediation.

An 11-Year Long Employment Case

Civil litigation clients often ask, “How long will this case take?” People who have never been involved in a civil court proceeding may be surprised to learn that civil matters are usually measured in years, not weeks. But how long can a lawsuit go on for? An employment law case released by the Ontario Court of Appeal this past year shows just how long a lawsuit in Ontario could take.

On January 31st, 2019, the Court of Appeal heard an appeal of a case which had been argued in 2016 and decided in 2017. The Court of Appeal was remarkably efficient, releasing its decision just six (6) weeks after the appeal was argued.

The interesting date in this case, however, is not the date on which the judgment at first instance was handed down, or the date on which the case was argued, but the date on which the case was commenced – 2008.

Most people understand that even after you go to court there is a right of appeal, and they understand that an appeal will add some time to the length of your legal matter. In this case, the time between judgment and appeal (less than two (2) years) was a drop in the bucket compared to the time between the commencement of the lawsuit and the argument at first instance, which took a staggering eight (8) years.

What we do not learn from the reported decision is whether or not there were valid reasons for the eight (8) years which transpired between the employment law case being commenced and it being argued at court. Extraordinary delays sometimes happen in civil litigation, but there are usually extraordinary events behind those delays, such as one of the lawyers being removed from the case due to illness, retirement, or death, for example.

A new rule came into effect in Ontario in 2012 with the goal of trying to prevent these sorts of extraordinary delays. Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure now requires the Registrar of the court to automatically dismiss every lawsuit which has not been set down for trial after the five-year anniversary of it having been commenced. This rule does not mean that a lawsuit has to go to trial within five (5) years, only that it has to be ready to go to trial within five (5) years. It seeks to strike a balance between giving parties and their lawyers enough time to prepare their lawsuit, while at the same time eliminating totally unreasonable delays.

And of course, this particular case is an outlier. Rarely will a relatively uncomplicated employment law case drag on for years, let alone eleven (11) years. But this case nevertheless stands as a marker of just how long, in some circumstances, a civil lawsuit can actually take.

Two Inconsistent Hockey Cases from Ontario

Does it help to have the right lawyer argue your case in court? We would like to think that it doesn’t matter: that the justice of the case will prevail, regardless of how persuasive your lawyer is.

Well, try telling that to Robbie Levita. He lost his personal injury lawsuit in 2015 in which he sued the guy who hit him from behind during the dying minutes of a rec-league hockey game. He has to be scratching his head at the more recently-released case of Casterton v MacIsaac, where Drew Casterton sued the guy who hit him during the dying the minutes of a rec-league hockey game and won a judgment for more than $700,000.00.

To find any substantial difference between Mr. Levita’s case and Mr. Casterton’s case is an exercise in splitting hairs very, very finely. Any difference between the cases is minor, while the similarities are striking:

LevitaCasterton
Playing in a “non-contact” recreational hockey league in OntarioPlaying in a “non-contact” recreational hockey league in Ontario
Signed a liability waiver in favour of the leagueSigned a liability waiver in favour of the league
Incident happened in the last minute of play, with his team trailingIncident happened in the last minute of play, with his team trailing
Hit by an opposing player while not in possession of the puckHit by an opposing player while not in possession of the puck
Suffered serious injuries, including a broken tibia and fibulaSuffered serious injuries, including long-term brain damage

To find any differences between these two incidents requires a fair degree of creative thinking. What tipped the results in either direction were the factual findings by the respective Judges. Mr. Justice Firestone found that that the guy who hit Mr. Levita did not do so with an intent to injure, while Madam Justice Gomery found that the guy who hit Mr. Casterton deliberately attempted to injure him, or was reckless about the possibility that he would do so. It was on these findings of fact that the respective cases turned.

The Casterton case shows that the Levita case could have easily turned out differently, and vice versa. One has to question how much of a role the advocacy of the respective lawyers played in these cases.

  • Did Mr. Casterton have more effective advocates than Mr. Levita?
  • Or, did the Defendant in the first case have more effective advocates than the Defendant in the second case?
  • Perhaps it was a combination of both?

At the same time, it may have been some other reason or reasons, completely unrelated to the effectiveness of counsel. Perhaps the Defendant in the Levita case came across as sympathetic and remorseful in a way that the Defendant in the Casterton case did not: we can only speculate. All the same, we cannot rule out the strong possibility that the effectiveness of counsel played some role in these two very similar cases ending up with very, very different results.